

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Definitive Treaty,

SIGNED AT

AIX LA CHAPELLE,

October 7th, 1748.

IN WHICH

The Advantages stipulated in the Articles of the said Treaty with respect to the present State of Things, and their Influence with regard to the future Posture of Affairs in *Europe*, are modestly but clearly demonstrated.

Nil est, quod non expuget pertinax opera, & intenta ac diligens cura. SEN. Ep. 50.



L O N D O N :

Printed for J. ROBERTS, at the King's Arms in
Warwick Lane. MDCCLXVIII.

(Price One Shilling.)

Wm. of. London Successor

CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE

Definitive Treaty,

SIGNED AT

AIX LA CHAPELLE,

October $\frac{7}{18}$ th, 1748.

IN WHICH

The Advantages stipulated in the Articles of the said Treaty with respect to the present State of Things, and their Influence with regard to the future Posture of Affairs in *Europe*, are modestly but clearly demonstrated.

Nihil est, quod non expuget pertinax opera, & intenta ac diligens cura. SEN. Ep. 50.



LONDON:

Printed for J. ROBERTS, at the *King's Arms* in
Warwick Lane. MDCCXLVIII.
(Price One Shilling.)



CONSIDERATIONS

ON THE LATE

Definitive Treaty



AMONGST the many invaluable Blessings we enjoy under our happy and excellent Constitution, that of the Liberty of the Press has been always esteemed, and with very great justice one of the most considerable. By this we are distinguished from other Nations, where, tho' all are equally concerned in Consequence of the right or wrong Management of publick Affairs, yet a few only are trusted with the Administration, and those few are at once both Parties and Judges; they conduct all Things at their Will and Pleasure, and whatever their Fellow-Subjects may feel from their Conduct, none but themselves are allowed the Privilege to speak. No wonder that, under such Circumstances, the Government is presumed to be ever in the Right: But methinks there is more Reason to wonder, that in a Country where true Liberty is found, and where every Man may speak full as freely as he thinks, so many

should incline to an implicit Belief that the Government is always in the wrong. A Belief which tends no less to the Prejudice of those who are ruled, than to the Perplexity of their Rulers, which serves the Purposes only of the worst Part of the Community, and puts it out of the Capacity even of the best Men to render such Services to their Country as they otherwise both could and would, since this as wise Men would be their Interest, and as honest Men it must be the Effects of their natural Inclination.

But the true Way of exercising this Blessing, and thereby shewing that it is such, is to employ it not in the Service of the Great, or to gratify the Humour of a Mob; not to serve the Purposes of a Party, or to answer the Ends of particular Persons; but for the common Advantage, for the Use to which it was designed, in support of the Constitution; by enlightening and informing the People, giving them just Notions of the Condition they are in, of the Measures taken by their Superiors, and of what may be expected from such Measures. Neither is it possible to deceive them long or often, if any Man should be wicked enough to go about it, and should proceed in that Wickedness with all the Art and Skill imaginable; because Facts would quickly set them right, and by comparing his Promises with Events, they would be at no Loss to discern whether he spoke Truth or not, and if not, whether it was through Mistake or Design. A Man in such a Case will labour indeed at first under Suspicion, let his Intention be ever so upright, and his Work will be read with Prejudice, from a Supposition that he writes under Direction; but when Time, that discloses all Things, shall do Justice both with regard to the Rectitude of his Aim, and the Sufficiency of his Lights, he will have the Satisfaction of finding, that Truth will make its Way, tho' slowly, and that it is possible to

acquire Reputation, without being the Tool either of a Ministry or a Faction. An Attempt of this kind is at all times justifiable, but at present it is both reasonable and requisite. We are just emerged out of a War, by which we were excessively exhausted, in the carrying on of which we had but little Encouragement, and towards the Expence of which we contributed beyond even our own Examples in former Times. To do this we have been forced to have Re-course to various Methods of raising Money, none of which were indeed inexcusable, and yet all of them justifiable only, by that dangerous Plea of Necessity, which may be used to justify any thing. At a Time therefore like this, if any thing can be done, said, or written to conciliate the Minds of Men, and to induce them to acquiesce in the Measures which have been pursued for extricating them out of such a War, and uniting them in their Endeavours to make the right and proper Use of the Peace, this will be certainly a publick Service; and he who is not satisfied with a Consciousness of this deserves no Reward, and will much lessen the Value of his Labours if he pretends to it.

We have, since the Preliminaries were signed in the Month of April last, heard Abundance of Objections railed, or rather Sarcasms thrown out against the Terms of the Peace, and against the Negotiators of it; but most of these have been equally removed from Argument and Decency, and for these Reasons have been probably thought not to stand in need of any Answer: For, in the Nature of Things, Absurdity and Abuse answer themselves, there is no Possibility of confuting Nonsense, and it is a very difficult Thing to make a Reply to Billingsgate. In such Cases, Silence is so far from being a Mark of Guilt, that it is the surest Sign of Innocence. Bad Men are the soonest angry, but a just Sense of being in the right will make People

easy, not only under the Misfortune of being mistaken, but under the greater Unhappiness of being maltreated. To behave well, and to be repaid with ill Language, was of old observed to be the Fate of Princes, and will, perhaps, as long as the World stands, be the Lot of their Ministers; and the Knowledge of this furnishes the best Presence, which is, hearing without Anger, and replying without Resentment. There is nothing easier than to defend a good Cause, because there is hardly any thing that can injure it, but the Advocate's deviating into unbecoming Language. He who is sure to speak Truth, may despise Invectives, nor need he be in any great Pain about the Arts of Persuasion, let him aim only at being perspicuous, and he will be eloquent of Course.

To make the Application of this Rule, as far as is within the Compass of my Power, I shall, without farther Introduction, declare that my Design is to dispose all candid and impartial Readers to have a good Opinion of this Treaty, and to incline them to make the right Use of that great Blessing of Peace, by banishing all domestick Jealousies and Heartburnings, in order to unite in concerting the most effectual Methods for paying our Debts, lessening our Taxes, and promoting Trade. To do this effectually, I shall make it my Business to shew, that this Peace was well-timed; by which I mean, that it was not entered upon either too soon or too late; that it has been conducted with great Dignity and Prudences negotiated with all possible Marks of Candour and Ability, and concluded upon Terms as advantageous and as salutary as those who were most sanguine in their Expectations could expect. After this is done, I shall demonstrate how little Weight there really is in what have been hitherto stiled popular Objections; and, lastly, I shall venture to offer a few

Conjectures as to the Operation of this Treaty, in reference to the future State of Things; and in handling these Points, I shall be so far from overstraining Things, or giving false Colours to what might otherwise wear a Form not altogether pleasing, that I shall make it my Business to avoid every thing that has the Appearance of Rhetorick, shall keep close to the Matters of Fact that are within my Province, without running into any Personal Panegyricks, as professing to recommend not Men but Measures, and seeking the Favour of the Publick, not the Approbation of those who are entrusted with publick Affairs. They are, without doubt, as well as other Men, intitled to Justice, and he who makes Use of the Liberty of the Press to defend their Measures, does them Justice, but no Favour, and therefore has no Merit to plead with them. This may be suspected at the Entrance of the Work; but, I doubt not, before I come to the Close of it, the Reader will be convinced of my Sincerity, and be satisfied that I speak and mean the same Thing.

It is stipulated In the second Article of the Treaty, That what is passed with respect to the War, shall be buried in profound and perpetual Oblivion; and therefore I will not pretend to enter at all into the Rise and Progress of this Dispute, into which, it is certain, that we did not enter from Motives of Ambition, or with a View to our private Interests: That is to say, we did not seek to aggrandize ourselves at the Expence of our Neighbours, but to do ourselves Justice, and to prevent any of our Neighbours from aggrandizing themselves at the Expence of our Allies, or by overturning that System, which the Reason of Things?, the successive Judgment of the wisest Politicians, and the Experience of many Years had shewn to be fittest for maintaining the Independency of the several *European Powers*, and promoting their Welfare and

Prosperity respectively. As our Intentions in this Respect were highly laudable, so our Constancy was very remarkable. We were not frightened from doing our Duty, either by the Appearance of distant Danger, or by the coining of it even to our own Doors: We were not wearied with the Expences, tho' they rose, as I have already observed, higher in Proportion than in former Times, and were raised with Difficulty enough: Neither were we disheartened by Disappointments, but supported them with Spirit and Firmness, as not our Friends only, but even our Enemies, have confessed. It is true, that we were very far from being always unsuccessful; so far from it, that our Naval Force gained us considerable Victories, and proved highly advantageous to us in other Respects; and at Land, the ever-memorable Victory at *Dettingen*, and the noble Efforts of the *British* Troops at *Fontenoy*, will do us Honour in succeeding Times.

It would be manifest injustice therefore to pretend, that we were hasty or precipitate in our Thoughts of making Peace: We did not entertain them before our Enemies, much less did we seek or propose them upon mean Terms. On the contrary, in the Times of greatest Danger, they were the farthest from our Minds; but when our Enemies were weary of exhausting their Blood and Treasure, and saw plainly that the Opposition given them was such, as would sooner or later defeat any Plans for extending their Power and Influence to a dangerous or destructive Height, they began to shew a Willingness to lay down their Arms, and to relinquish those Conquests that had cost them so dear, and which it was impossible we should see them retain, while we had any Regard to our own Honour or Safety. This being the Case, (and that it was the Case, all *Europe* is sensible, and the Treaty itself expressly declares) they could have no Grounds to

over-value their Condescension, or to under-value us for being willing to listen to Overtures that were in themselves reasonable, and that were very far from being embraced with that kind of Eagerness that might seem to proceed either from a conscious Incapacity, or a total Dejection.

As our Enemies had no Cause to triumph, so we never gave our Allies the least Occasion to complain; we were always ready to concert proper Measures for the Maintenance of the common Cause, and we never failed to perform with Punctuality, what with Alacrity we had undertaken. We never attempted to chicaner or wrangle, but shewed the utmost Willingness not only to bear our Part, but even more than our Part, whenever it was found to be necessary. We were never wanting in our Assistance, when it appeared to be requisite, even in Cases that did not fall within the Limits of our Stipulations; neither did we listen to any Terms of Accommodation that might be forced upon them by their Distress, but with the utmost Cheerfulness supported the War in all the different Scenes of Action, till it was evident that there was no longer any Danger of their being reduced to accept of Terms destructive or dishonourable. Nay, when Peace was offered, and Negotiations entered into, we proceeded entirely in Conjunction, and at last broke them off, when they appeared to be unacceptable to them. Neither were these Negotiations revived, till such Time as the Affairs of our Allies made it absolutely necessary, and till all *Europe* saw that we had to the full, as great a Regard for their Security as for our own.

After making these Reflexions, it may not be amiss to come a little nearer, and to observe, that notwithstanding all the Difficulties they had to struggle with, and these were not a few, those at the

Helm did not in Earnest venture upon a Negotiation, till all the Parties in the Nation had not only declared, but I may truly say, had clamoured for Peace. It is not so long ago that we should forget, neither were these Remonstrances made in such a Manner, that, if it was at all necessary, we should be unable to prove this; but the Point being both recent and publick, there seems to be no Necessity of doing it; for notwithstanding that some have since thought fit to talk in another Strain, yet all candid and impartial Judges must be sufficiently satisfy'd, that this arises only from a Change of Circumstances, and that the same Thing would have happened, had these Negotiations been till now, or indeed ever so long delayed.

It must therefore be admitted, that a properer Time could not have been chosen, than that which was made choice of to treat, our Enemies shewed a Disposition, and professed a Willingness to listen to Reason; when our Allies were in Circumstances that would admit of no Delay, and when the Parties in this Nation, who very seldom agree in their Sentiments upon any Point of publick Concern, seem'd not only to desire a Peace, but upon the Point of treating it as a Thing criminal in the Ministers, that they had declined the several Offers made them, not for a general only, but a separate Peace. If at such a Time, and in such a Situation, they were not Justified in taking the necessary Steps for putting an End to so burthensome a War, and for procuring a Peace, that was so requisite in the Sentiments of all, who could pretend in any Reason to form a Judgment upon the Point, it is not easy to discern when, or how, they could ever be Justified. But when they had taken such Resolutions as in that State were the most proper, they entered upon the Execution of them with much Calmness and Consideration; and as they were not hasty in

beginning a Negotiation, so when it was begun they acted with such Steadiness and Secresy, as to bring nothing to a Conclusion, till they were sure of stipulating such Terms as might effectually provide for the Points that had been held of the greatest Consequence during the Continuance of the War, and for the procuring of which it had been so long continued.

It ought to be no Diminution to the Weight of this Argument, that the Facts upon which it turns are far from being new, or picked up in the Anti-chambers of present or of past Ministers. Indeed this is so far from being the Case, that their publick Notoriety makes them so much the fitter for my Purpose, who do not mean to amuse my Readers with fine-spun Tales and curious Anecdotes, but to shew them the Truth, by Arguments that are deduced from Evidence, which is directly within their own Reach. The Fitness of the Time, in reference to those at the Helm, remains then a Thing out of all Question; and perhaps this might have been urged with great Shew of Reason, in Excuse even for accepting disadvantageous Terms; but to treat at such a Time, not only without Disadvantage, but with Credit and Safety, was no easy Thing, was scarce to be expected, and for this Reason only I think is hardly believed. But Matters of Fact will put this likewise out of Doubt, and when we have once shewn with what Dexterity and Address the whole Negotiation was managed, we shall very clearly make it appear, that the Terms are such as ought to be approved and applauded, and as visibly demonstrate, they were settled and obtained by Men of sound Heads and honest Hearts, who knew the Price that was set upon Peace by those with whom they treated, resolved to drive their Bargain hard, and to keep up the Market to its greatest possible Height.

When the Resolution was taken of treating, and it is very possible when some Ideas were formed of the Terms upon which a Peace might be made, our military Preparations were far from being suspended, every Thing took its Course as if the War was to be continued with Vigour; our Squadrons sailed for both *Indies*, our Fleet was reinforced in the *Mediterranean*, and the March of the *Russians* was pressed as a Thing of the last Importance, and the Measure upon which we most depended. I could mention some other Points of the same Nature, but that it would draw my Discourse into too great a Length, and thereby weaken its Force and lessen its Perspicuity. Let it suffice then to say, that as these Schemes were sensibly laid, they had a very happy Effect. The Enemy very plainly saw, that we had still great Resources, and meant to depend upon them, if they set their Pretensions too high. Our Allies saw clearly, that we did not mean a separate or a partial Peace, a Peace to which they might be bound to assent, or to which they might be compelled to submit; but such a one as might be suitable to all Parties, and either repair the Losses of the War, or establish so solid and so salutary a Peace, as that the Effects thereof quickly should. At home the People saw, or might have seen the Propriety of this Disposition, which however some who knew, or ought to have known better, were pleased to represent as a Mixture of martial and pacifick Resolutions, that would not either promote the War or produce a Peace,

Upon the first Meetings *Aix la Chapelle*, a Resolution was taken of laying aside Forms as much as possible, and proceeding to Business. The Method of doing this was quickly adjusted, but studiously concealed. The Magistrates and the Inhabitants went on with their Preparations, the Place of meeting was appointed, and the solemn Opening of the Congress

was a Thing looked for, even among some quick-sighted Politicians. In the mean time the Ministers met and conferred, and very soon saw that each was a perfect Judge of his own Strength, and that upon the whole, the Scales were not quite so uneven as the World generally imagined. The Superiority of our Naval Force was an Equivalent for the *French* Power in the *Low Countries*, the March of the *Russians* balanced the Fate of *Maestricht*; for to have penetrated into the Heart of *Holland* might have been attended with untoward Circumstances, and to have pushed the allied Army on the Side of *Germany* would perhaps have determined the Measures of the *Germanick* Body, and must inevitably have hastened the Junction of the *Russian*, The Business then was not, to lose Time in Formalities, but to reduce the Terms within a moderate Compass, to express the Sense of them clearly, and to give them such a Sanction as might prevent their being unravelled, suddenly and at once.

One cannot but be aware that a Matter of this Nature and of this Importance, could not be transacted without great Difficulties, or without much Management and Address. Instead of being hard, it would be the easiest Thing in the World to set this in a very strong Light; to shew how few of the Ministers, who were admitted to these Conferences, could with Reason be supposed to have the bringing Matters to a short Issue, and that upon practicable Terms, at Heart. How many other Courts were looking on, and only waiting for some certain Signals to interpose their Memorials, and lay the Foundation of Enquiries and Discussions, that might have taken up not barely Days and Weeks, but have required even Months and Years? How many Accidents might have intervened, while the Ceremonial had been regulated, the Points in

the common Order distinctly debated, and the Instrument drawn up in the customary Form? I say, it would be very easy to expatiate upon these, and thereby shew, that, without some Expedient capable of averting these Delays, the favourable Opportunity of coming to a Conclusion had been lost, some important and decisive Stroke had probably given a new Face to Affairs, and perhaps another Year might have been spent in fighting Things into such a State of Equality as when the Conferences were opened at *Aix la Chapelle*. To seize this critical Moment therefore, and to give a Check to the Military Operations, was at once a most delicate and a most necessary Point to achieve.

It may not be amiss, however, if I take the Liberty of putting the Publick in Mind, that it was no Secret that there were, in certain Countries, Parties disposed to make a Point of carrying on the War, notwithstanding Peace was so visibly and so glaringly necessary, and without excelling them in Vigilance, there was no disappointing these Views. Now, in the midst of these intricate Embarrassments, the able Negotiators took their Measures with such Spirit and Secrecy, and conducted every kind of Form that was indispensably necessary, in so clear and unexceptionable a Manner, that Matters were brought to bear, and the Particulars relative to a general Pacification, were reduced to a Consistency, not only before the World expected, but before they had so much as a bare Suspicion of it. The Preparations were still going on, the Opening of the Congress was from time to time postponed, Couriers arrived and were dispatched about Things that seemed to be of no great Importance, and only a few previous Conferences were held, into which it was scarce supposed that the very Out-lines of Business would enter. Yet in these Conferences this great Affair was not only canvass'd, but concluded with so masterly a

Turn, that the signing of the Preliminaries was not only known, but declared by Authority, at the *Hague*, at *London*, and at *Paris*, by that time it was well whispered at *Aix la Chapelle* All the Complaisance shewn upon this Occasion by the Negotiators, was allowing the Fortress of *Maestricht* to be taken, after Provision had been made that it should be restored, because no fair Pretence should be left to a certain great Soldier to say, that the Conclusion of the Pacification might have been made without throwing a Shade upon his Victories. This, and other Precautions had the desired Effects, a Cessation of Hostilities ensued, and by tasting the first Fruits of Peace, the People in every Country lent their Assistance, as far as it went, to those who made it their Business to promote its thorough and absolute Establishment.

The same Sagacity, Industry and Secrecy was absolutely requisite in the Prosecution of that important Negotiation, and to prevent any of the capital Articles from being brought again into Debate. I will not say that the bringing the Definitive Treaty to a Conclusion was as arduous and difficult, but I will make no Scruple of affirming, that it was as nice and delicate an Affair as the settling and subscribing the Preliminaries; nor do I in the least scruple gaining Credit with the Reader, when I put him in Mind, that there was nothing now of Surprize in the Case; every one's Eyes were open and attentive, every Colour of an Objection had not only been started and tried, but dressed in the most formidable Manner, and brought upon the Stage with all the Advantages that Rhetorick could give it. The Ministers, however, remained steady to their Point and to their Principles; they had done excellently well towards making a Peace that ought to please every body, and to make one that should absolutely please all, they were sensible was not within

the Limits of human Capacity. They had proportioned the Gain and the Loss of all Parties so happily, that none were willing to part with the former even to be rid of the latter. The Complaints made from a Variety of Quarters served only to Justify their Impartiality; and therefore, taking Care in the Interval to secure the Foundation they had laid from being shaken, by certain judicious and well-timed Conventions, they gave as much Time as was requisite to overcome Prepossessions in some Quarters, and to dispel the Prejudices that had been conceived in others, by which Means they brought this Work to its Consummation in five Months, which, whatever is thought of it now, will appear almost incredible to Posterity; and notwithstanding the Provision in the separate Articles, one may venture to foretel, that the Treaty of *Aix la Chapelle* will be considered as a Model in succeeding Times, and be thought in them what it ought to be thought in these, a Master-piece of Politicks, and a Negotiation, which, as it is without Example, it will be found very difficult to parallel.

After having thus explained, and set in its true Light, that Prudence, Penetration and Address which was shewn, in compromising, in so short a Time, and in spite of so many embarrassing Circumstances, Controversies so complicated, that Statesmen of inferior Parts must have despaired of ever adjusting; we come next to consider the Terms of the Definitive Treaty, in order to make it plain to every competent Understanding, that they are not huddled together, in the way of a temporary Expedient, but are so well contrived as to Promise fair for affording us a solid and lasting Peace. If, in order to do this, we should insist particularly and expresly upon each, or even upon the principal Articles of the Definitive Treaty, it would not only lead us into a great Length, which

might endanger our tiring the Reader's Attention, but must introduce such a Variety of Matter, as must almost necessarily perplex his Judgment. We will therefore, to avoid both Inconveniencies, endeavour to take a shorter Way, which shall be at the same time more satisfactory and more convincing, and not only so, but will enable every Reader to run through and examine the Particulars of the Treaty with a perfect Comprehension of their Connection with each other, and a Just Notion of that System which arises from the combined Force of all the various Stipulations in favour of so many different Powers.

The principal Object of the War upon the Continent was to defeat the Design of aggrandizing the House of *Bourbon* in such a Manner as might be dangerous to the Liberties of *Europe*, and destructive of that Settlement in favour of the House of *Austria*, which so many of the great Powers in *Europe* had undertaken to guaranty and defend. This End seems to be entirely answered by the Definitive Treaty, which renews, in the most positive Terms, and without the least Restriction or Reserve, the Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction, excepting only the temporary Settlement in favour of Don *Philip*, which is not like to last for many Years, and the Cessions made to the King of *Sardinia*. It is true that by this Treaty *Silesia* is guaranty'd to the King of *Prussia*; but as it was not given him by this Treaty, it ought not to be looked upon as one of the Sacrifices made for obtaining the present Peace. We may therefore say, that, exclusive of the temporary Settlement, and of the Cessions before mentioned, the Pragmatick Sanction is at length fixed upon a firmer Foundation than ever; and as the temporary Establishment before mentioned is the single Acquisition the House of *Bourbon* has made by so long, so expensive, and so bloody a War, we cannot

but be sensible that her Power is very little heightened thereby, whereas that of the House of *Austria* was never so great, so conspicuous, and so thoroughly settled as at present.

Another Object we had in view, was to recover out of the Hands of France the Conquests she had made, and which it was impossible we could sheath our Swords while she retained. This has been likewise obtained in its utmost Latitude and Extent. The Empress Queen, the King of Sardinia, and the States General, are to have, without Restriction, all their Possessions restored, in consideration of no other Equivalent than that temporary Settlement before mentioned. It is indeed very certain, that these Countries have been very much harrassed, and some of the Fortresses in them much injured, if not demolished; but however, if we consider what a Length of Time, what an Effusion of Blood, and what a Waste of Treasure it would have cost the Allies, and us in particular, before these Countries could have been recovered by Force of Arms, we must be very blind indeed, if we do not see that it is infinitely advantageous to have them restored, even in the Condition they are in, and their being retaken in the Progress of the War, would not have put them in a better, so that this is a Circumstance of very great Importance, and with which we have all the Reason imaginable to be highly pleased and satisfied.

Another Object of the War was restoring the Balance of Power wherever it was lost, and preserving and supporting it where it still subsisted. Now this is very effectually answered by the Definitive Treaty, and by its immediate Consequences, as will manifestly appear if we will but give ourselves the Trouble to examine them. In *Italy* the Hands of the King of *Sardinia* are strengthened; and as he guards the

Entrance of this Country, and has defended it so successfully during the Course of the present War, in which, as well as in the Conclusion of the Peace, he has received such convincing Marks of the Fidelity of *Great Britain* to her Engagements, we cannot doubt his persisting in the like Conduct for the future; and then Experience has shewn us, that, in Conjunction with the Empress Queen, there wants not Force enough to preserve the Balance in that Country. For such is the Situation of Don *Philip's* Settlement, that, in a Time of War, it could be only safe by a Neutrality; and if this should be refused, there would be very little more Difficulty in reducing his Dutchies than were found in expelling the Duke of *Modena*. As to the Republick of *Genoa*, it is more than probable the Events of the War will teach her to set a higher Value upon a Neutrality than in Times past, and if she should not, the Danger would not be very great, since it is evident, that when in a more flourishing Condition than she is like to be in haste, she has had much ado to preserve her Capital. The Definitive Treaty, therefore, has done nothing towards injuring the Balance in this Part of *Europe*; and yet this is the only Part where, even with the Shadow of Argument, that might be pretended. This will appear still plainer, if we reflect that the Passage through *Tyrol* is so much a readier, safer, and shorter Road into *Italy* than any other, that it is not easy to foresee any Attempt upon this Country, unless the Arms of the Empress Queen were previously engaged in *Germany*, which, in all human Probability, will not happen in our Times, or the King of *Sardinia* gained to the House of *Bourbon*; which is as little probable, because it must be attended with his falling immediately into a State of Dependance; which, in the Sentiments of wise Princes, differs very little from a State of Destruction.

In *Germany*, the Stipulations in the Definitive Treaty must be as effectual. His Imperial Majesty's Title is clearly owned by the only Powers in *Europe* which hesitated in acknowledging him, and thereby not only the Pretences, but the Means of disturbing the Peace of the *Germanick* Body, are absolutely removed; since the proper Methods may be at any Time made use of, to correct whatever has the Appearance of Irreverence to the August Chief of the Empire: Neither will these be found mere Words of Course, but a plain and true State of Facts; for in Time of Peace, the Princes and States of *Germany* are led, from the Nature of their Constitution, to a frequent Recourse to the Imperial Authority, which is thereby strengthened and supported; so that in a very little Space it will be found, that notwithstanding any Intrigues which may be set on Foot to prevent it, the Influence of his present Imperial Majesty will extend as far as that of any of his Predecessors, and the Splendor of the House of *Austria* be as illustrious and conspicuous, and its Power to the full as great, as at any Time within our Memory; which is all that can be wished for or desired in reference to the Balance in that Country, which has been always, and will ever remain, a Thing of the highest Importance to the general Tranquility of Europe, and to the Maintenance of that Independency, which is, truly and strictly speaking, that common Cause, a close Adherence to which, must be the invariable Interest of the Maritime Powers.

Lastly, As to our own Concerns, they have all the Care taken of them, and will receive all the Benefit from the Clauses in the Definitive Treaty, relating to them, that could be Reasonably expected or desired. For by this Treaty, the Guaranty of the Succession of the Crown is confirmed in the clearest Terms, and

extended to all the Powers that have any Interests in the Treaty. The Demolition of the Port of *Dunkirk* is settled upon the Foot of former Treaties, which is all that could be pretended to for our Security. Our Claims in respect to Commerce, are as well, and as far adjusted with the Court of *Spain*, as it was proper or convenient they should be by a general Peace; and all the Rights derived to us by former Treaties being confirmed, we have as good a Title as we possibly can have, to expect that they shall be made good to us by the Court of *Madrid*: And in what Manner these shall be regulated to our intire Satisfaction, is left to a subsequent Negotiation between the two Courts, which now, that all Causes of Diffidence and Jealousy are removed, there is not the least Colour to suspect will not be speedily and effectually adjusted. Upon the whole therefore, if we consider the Causes of the War, the Progress and Events of it, and the Circumstances of Things at the Time when this Negotiation was set on foot, and compare these with the whole Tenor of the Treaty, or with any of the particular Articles which it contains, we shall find the strongest Motives to remain perfectly pleased and satisfied with its Contents; since from thence it will be manifest, that all Rancour and Malice are extinguished; not from the bare Words of the Treaty, (tho' these are as clear and express as Words can be) but from the Effects of it, such as the Confirmation and Guaranty of the Pragmatic Sanction, and of the Succession of the Crown of *Great Britain* on one Side, together with the intire Restitution of all Conquests; and on the other Side, the granting an Establishment to Don *Philip*, and making other Provisions for removing all, even to the most trivial Grounds of Altercations and Disputes. These were Things needful and necessary, what we had Reason to expect should be done, and what we ought

therefore to rejoice to see done: And, had the Conferences been extended any farther, to the Cognizance of the Demands, and regulating the Pretensions of other Princes and Powers, than those which were immediately engaged in the War, it would not only have produced needless, and almost endless Deliberations, but must likewise have involved us in a Variety of new Guaranties; which, one may presume, is what no true Lover of Peace, or of his Country, would have relished. An entire Abolition of past Resentments, and a good Foundation for future Quiet, seemed to be the essential Marks of a wise and well-made Peace; and it is from the Definitive Treaty's having these in a Degree equally conspicuous and indisputable, that one may venture to pronounce it such, whatever those who are Resolved never to be satisfied, may be either inclined, or find it necessary, to say against it.

This leads us to speak of the most plausible Objections, that have been made to this necessary and salutary Transaction. As indeed, what is there either so requisite in itself, or so well and wisely conducted in the bringing it to bear, which will not be exposed to Objection, in a Country more especially, where every Man takes the Liberty of forming and speaking his Opinion, even as to Things that it is next to an Impossibility he should comprehend, or conceive clearly; in a Country too, where, from a new and a very bad Habit, Numbers have fallen into a way of treating with Rudeness and Burlesque, even the most serious and solemn Subjects; as if there was nothing in Nature that deserved to be looked upon in any better Light than a Jest; that the World was really, as well as metaphorically, a Theatre, upon the Stage of which, none but Farces were performed; and in a Country too, where of late, Malice or Spleen has diffused itself to an

incredible Extent, and mixing with the Spirit of Ridicule before-mentioned, has brought Libel and Lampon to be the only fashionable kind of Writing, and every Man into Contempt who wishes well to his Country without being paid for it, or thinks favourably of any Administration with whom he has no immediate Connection, or to which he lies under no particular Obligation. It would be indeed a tedious, and at the same Time a very trifling Employment, for any one to undertake the Refutation of all the Objections, that such kind of People may throw out; and this therefore will excuse me from insisting upon any, except those that wear the Appearance at least of Reason and Argument, and this chiefly for their Sakes who may be imposed upon by such Appearances.

Amongst these the first is, That no Part of these Negotiations have been communicated to Parliament, tho' they were begun, and even the Preliminaries were signed during the last Sessions of Parliament. In Answer to this, I shall in the first place observe. That tho' this Point has been laid down with great Emphasis, and very positively, yet at the Bottom it is not very well grounded; because both before the Negotiation was entered into, and during its Continuance, the Sense of Parliament might be very well known, and very safely collected by the Ministers, from what passed in Parliament; and they might think it more for the Honour of the Nation, tho' not more for the Safety of themselves, to act from those Hints, than to insist upon direct Resolutions, which might have been better Warrants, but would not perhaps have afforded clearer Instructions. In the next Place, such a Proceeding would have been absolutely inconsistent with the Nature and Manner of this Negotiation; as on the other hand it has been already proved, that however new and unprecedented this Method of

Negotiation might be, it was from thence, and thence only, that its Success was derived. To this I will venture to add, that the Direction so much and so loudly insisted upon, was unnecessary, and would have been unparliamentary. Those who have bad Designs, and aim at accomplishing those Designs without Hazard, may endeavour so to colour and disguise them, as to obtain, and entrench themselves behind the Sanction of Parliament; but this is not either necessary or fit to be done, by Persons who mean fairly: And many true Patriots have often, upon Applications made for such kind of Instructions, told the Ministers with great Truth and Spirit, that the Prerogative of the Crown was in their Hands, that they ought to manage it for the Honour and Interest of the Nation, and they would then have no Reason to fear any Censure, but on the contrary, might Justly expect the Thanks of its Representatives.

Another Point that has been very loudly recommended to publick Notice, is the Convention for sending back the *Russians*. It has been represented as a Thing absolutely indefensible to put the Nation to the Expence of that Body of Troops, and after putting it to that Expence, and making those Troops undertake so long and difficult a March, to send them back again at that very Juncture, when by joining the Army of the Allies, they might have been rendered highly useful. Now, in answer to this, let it be considered, that the taking these Forces into the Pay of the Maritime Powers, and marching them into *Germany*, was a Thing equally necessary for carrying on the War, if that must have been carried on, and by affording a Possibility of doing this, to put us in the way of obtaining a safe and honourable Peace. This, therefore, very clearly Justifies the first Measure, of taking them into our Service, and of marching them

into *Germany*; nor will it take any thing from the Weight of my Argument, that this Step did not actually contribute to the Maintenance of an uncertain War, since it is known to all the World, that it had the other and better Effect, of contributing to the Re-establishment of publick Tranquillity by a Peace. As to the Measure of marching them back again, the best Way of accounting for it, is to consider what would have followed in Case it had not been taken. In the first place, it could not but have given Umbrage to the *French* Court, which, considering they had suspended the Progress of their Arms, when those Troops were not immediately at hand to facilitate the Conferences at *Aix la Chapelle*, would not have been either decent or prudent. It must have Occasioned the assembling a *French* Army upon the *Moselle*, and have given Weight to that Party in the Council of *Versailles* that were inclined to traverse all pacifick Measures. Lastly, it is not at all impossible that it might have rendered other People intractable, and thereby increased the Number, or heightened the Nature of those Difficulties by which our Negotiation was at that critical Conjuncture very much perplexed. But the Convention for sending back these Troops not only removed all these Inconveniencies, but relieved the *Low Countries* from the Weight of an equal Number of *French* Forces, shewed a reciprocal Confidence in both Parties, and I will take upon me to say, went as far towards promoting the Conclusion of the Peace, as the March of those Troops did to the signing the Preliminaries. If therefore Peace be a good Thing, neither of these Steps ought to be complained of, or those who advised or carried them into Execution censured.

The last Objection that I shall mention is with regard to Hostages, which has been very cavalierly

treated by some Persons, as if it was a Thing unusual, unnecessary, and even derogatory to the Honour of this Crown and Nation. Those who stile it unusual, cannot be well acquainted with the Law of Nations, in which the giving, accepting, and receiving Hostages, are Points largely treated and fully settled. Next, that it should be a Thing unnecessary cannot be easily conceived by any who have attentively read the Ninth Article, by which the sending of Hostages is stipulated, since. it plainly appears from thence, that the Cessions and Restitutions are to keep Pace with each other, and to be reciprocally given up, in such a Manner as that each Party, at the same Time, may give and receive in a due Proportion; but with respect to the *British* Crown and Nation, the Circumstances of our Conquests being such, that there is an absolute Incertainty as to the Time in which they can be restored, there was no other Method of fettling this Point in a satisfactory Manner, and agreeable to the precise and punctual Method pursued with regard to other Powers, than this of giving Hostages for performing our Part of the Stipulations, that no unreasonable Delay might be Occasioned by waiting till the specific Restitutions were made: And hence it is as clear as any Thing can be, that we consented to give Hostages, because, from the Nature of Things, it was necessary. As to its being derogatory to the Honour of the Crown or Nation, it is a very strange, as well as a very groundless Notion: For the plain Reason of our giving Hostages is, because in one Part of the World we actually have made Conquests, and are supposed to have a superior Force, capable of making Conquests in other Parts, whereas the *French* have nothing in their Hands of ours, and consequently have no Equivalent to restore. If therefore we consider it in this Light, which beyond Question is the Light it should be considered in, it is to

the Honour of the Crown and Nation, and for the Glory of our Arms; and those who see it in any other Light, must see through the false Medium of their own ill Humours, Prejudices and Prepossessions, against which it was impossible for our Plenipotentiaries, or for the wisest and greatest Politicians, to provide.

We are now come to the last Head of our Observations, which refers to the Consequences of this Treaty, and the Effects that may be Reasonably supposed it may and will have upon the Affairs of *Europe*: And in treating this we shall be very careful of advancing any thing that is not perfectly clear, in its Nature, and morally certain in respect to what is deduced from it; for there is nothing farther from the Design of this little Discourse, than to amuse Mankind with plausible Pretences, fanciful Conjectures, and specious Promises; what we aim at is directly the reverse; for we would willingly cure the Publick of Causeless Jealousies, false Fears, and groundless Apprehensions, by dispelling the Mists from before their Eyes, and shewing the fair and full Prospect of Things as they lie in Nature; and we flatter ourselves that this may be done so effectually, as to leave no candid or impartial Enquirer under any kind of Doubt, as to the Truth and Reality of what we shall advance upon so Interesting and so important an Occasion.

In the first place then, it is clear, that tho' there is no Notice taken of the Affairs of the North in the Definitive Treaty, yet the Balance of Power, in that Part of *Europe*, must receive very high Advantages from its immediate Effects. Her Imperial Majesty of *Russia* will receive a very considerable Subsidy from the Maritime Powers, for a settled Space of Time at a very critical Conjunction, and will, in the Beginning of the Spring, have those Troops that were to have been employed in their Service in her own Dominions. This

is an additional Proof of the Wisdom and Propriety of that Measure which has been so much controverted, the taking those Troops so late into our Pay, and the contracting for them beyond the Time that there was a Probability of employing them. One might expatiate largely upon this Subject, and find no great Difficulty in proving, if for certain Reasons that were not at this Time inexpedient, that we could not have taken a better or more effectual Method than this, for answering Purposes it was of all others our Interest should be thoroughly answered. By this seasonable Supply to *Russia*, and by disengaging the Empress Queen of *Hungary* and *Bohemia*, the natural and powerful Ally of *Russia*, from a burthensome and dangerous War that fully employed all her Forces, we have done all that it was fit for us to do for the Maintenance of a Cause which, in several Respects, very nearly concerns us, and there is very great Probability may tend to bring the Disputes in the North to a Way of being compromised to the Satisfaction of all Parties, and to the general Benefit of Christendom.

The Broils and Discords of *Germany* are in a fair Way of being thoroughly extinguished, and their Imperial Majesties seem to be so well disposed to remove all those Obstacles which have hitherto hindered the Heads of the Empire and the Sovereigns of the House of *Austria* from being able to support their just Authority, that we may very soon expect to see every Part of their Dominions in a flourishing and secure Condition, and at the same time, their Power become so formidable as, with the Conjunction of their natural Allies, to be in a Condition fully able to sustain the Liberties of *Europe*, and put the common Cause out of all Danger of being injured, either by open Force or secret Fraud, if, in our Times, this should be

attempted. Whoever considers the Certainty of this, and compares it with the Situation of Things but a few Years past, will see that we have great Cause to be thankful to Providence for the Change, and to be very confident that we shall not be liable, within a moderate Compass of Years, to those dreadful Alarms that so Justly excited our Apprehensions when the Flame of the War now distinguished first broke out.

We have such a Knowledge of the Principles and Politicks of the *Italian* Courts, that without Fear if the Imputation of being over secure, we may look upon the Tranquillity of that Country as a Thing that will be quickly settled in such a Manner as to prevent its being suddenly shaken. Some Powers there, have received such Testimonies of our Friendship, some have so severely felt our Resentment, and the rest are so thoroughly convinced of our Power, that we may rationally rely upon having all the Respect paid us by them that we can wish. At the same time we know, that if they are Heady to their own Interests, and pursue that Plan which their own Prudence must dictate, they cannot take other Steps than we could desire; so that it may be safely averred, that, scarcely within our Memory, the Affairs of that Country were ever in a better State than they now are, or quickly will be, that is to say, when the Conferences at *Nice*, and perhaps some other amicable Negotiations, shall have settled the Dominions of the Princes and States there in that Order which will suit best with their respective Conveniencies.

By the Conclusion of the Definitive Treaty, our near Neighbours and natural Allies the *Dutch* will have that Leisure given them which they so much wanted, for restoring the Force, and reviving the Credit of their Government, by recurring to its first Principles; which we have Cause not only to hope, but to expect will very

speedily raise them into another Point of Light, than that in which they stood at the Time of the breaking out, and during the whole Continuance of the War. The raising the Prince of *Orange* to the high Dignity of Hereditary Stadtholder of the Union, the free Gift, and many other Circumstances that we need not enumerate, very plainly prove, that they are found at Heart, and have a great interior Strength, which they will now have an Opportunity to exert, in giving its due Form and Place to whatever may serve for the salutary Purposes of restoring Health and Vigour to their Constitution; and in Consequence of that. Authority to their Government, and Activity in its Administration. They have had sufficient Experience of the Danger of trading to temporary Neutralities and specious Promises; they have received new Lights as to the Importance of that Barrier which they so strangely lost, and have now so happily recovered; they have severely felt the Mischiefs that necessarily arose from suffering Military Discipline to decline, and their Naval Force to decay. We may therefore Promise ourselves, from the Wisdom and Magnanimity of that great Prince now at the Head of their Councils and their Administration, from the Capacity of the Ministers now entrusted with their Affairs, and from the general Turn and Disposition of the People, that Things will soon wear a new Face; and that the Maritime Powers, acting in Conjunction, be as able as they ever were, to hold the Balance of Power, and to prevent Laws from being prescribed by any Potentate in *Europe*.

It is true we have hitherto considered only one Side of the Picture, but we may likewise look upon the other without either Tremor or Apprehension. The War has greatly weakened and exhausted the Forces of the House of *Bourbon*; the Peace itself speaks this in

Terms very clear and expressive, the great Reforms, new Schemes of Oeconomy, and other Projects that are so much talked of, are farther Proofs of the same thing; and if this was a proper Place or Time, we might add many more convincing Circumstances: But as there is no need of it, so we have no Inclination to run into Disquisitions that might be inconvenient, at the same Time that they are unnecessary. The Allies of that House have not been Gainers by the War in any Shape; on the contrary, some have been so great Losers, that were it possible for them to forget their Sufferings, they are not like, at least: in our Times, to be in any Condition of running into the like Excesses. We may add to this, that as all Events are in the Womb of Time, so it is very possible that due may bring forth some which may lessen the Danger of their Neighbours, by finding Business enough at home, even for their most refined and able Statesmen. However that Matter may be, he might perhaps be no false Prophet who should venture to foretell, that the next War in Europe will not rise like the two last, from Disputes about the *Austrian* Succession.

There are many People, who from a splenetick Disposition, incline to affright themselves and their Neighbours, by drawing dark Descriptions of the present State of Things, and of approaching Dangers: There are others, who tho' they have no real Fears themselves, have a Pleasure in alarming the rest of Mankind, by displaying their Sagacity in giving Things such Colours, as may deceive Men of meaner Understandings: And there are again a third Sort, who have an Interest in doing this, because it gives them an Ascendency over such as they can terrify with these Phantoms. There are also sanguine People who can fill the Heads of those inclined to listen to them, with visionary Expectations of Advantages that are not in

Nature; but it is hoped, that nothing of either Temper will be discovered in this short Discourse, which as it claims no Merit from its Composition, so it is written without the least View either to flatter or to offend any Party. If we have ever departed from Truth, or from Probability, it has been accidentally and by Mistake, not from any private View or with any concealed Design. The Subject that is here discussed, will doubtless employ many other Pens, and may be possibly considered in very different Lights, but will never be handled with less of Prejudice or Prepossession.

The single Principle, that from this Deduction of Things we would inculcate, is this. That we have at length obtained what every honest, well-meaning, and sensible Briton wished, a speedy and safe Extrication from a burthensome and bloody War, by a Peace that has put both our selves and our Allies into a Condition, which it is our Business to improve, and to this we ought to bend our whole Attention. To wrangle about past Mistakes will be to very little Purpose; all the Parties in these Kingdoms have made enough, to wish for a general Oblivion; and it is certainly our Happiness at present, that taking Things as they stand, we have no Reason to question that all may be set right, and that Frugality, Industry, Patience, Publick Spirit and Unanimity, may enable us to pursue such Steps as may repair all past Errors, give the necessary Ease and Relief to the People, which the Taxes they have so long endured requires; and thereby put it in their Power to strengthen the Hands of the Government, which from late, as well as long past Experience, we know they will be always ready to do, when any real Emergency requires it. Upon the embracing with Sincerity this Principle, and adhering to it inflexibly, our future Prosperity must depend; and

it imports us very much to remember, that how well soever our Ministers may have discharged their Trust in negotiating; for us a safe and honourable Peace abroad, our Security, Peace and Welfare at home, depends entirely upon ourselves.

If we look on other States and take a View of the Condition and Conduct of all the Nations that have suffered from this Calamity, I mean from the Calamity of War; for a general Calamity it was, and the Inhabitants of every Country engaged in it, felt it more or less, tho' none so lightly as ourselves: If, I say, we consider their Behaviour upon this Occasion, we shall find that they are intent upon nothing else than what is recommended above. In *France* they are proceeding to vast Reductions in every Part of their Expences, they are desirous of finding out new Methods for encouraging and the reviving of their Manufactures; for supplying that vast Loss they have sustained in their Shipping; for restoring their sinking Commerce; and in fine, whatever else may contribute to diffuse the Balm of Peace, in such a Manner, as that in Time, it may at least heal the Wounds, if not efface the Marks of the War. In *Spain* the same Notions prevail, and are pursued as fast and as far as the Genius of that Government will permit. In *Genoa* their Councils are entirely turned to this Point, and the great Disputes among them arise from the Warmth of those who espouse different Schemes for re-establishing and improving that Commerce upon which the Welfare of their State depends. Now it is an old and a very good Maxim, that we ought to learn even from our Enemies. In this Case, without doubt, the Lesson they give us is a very good one, and we ought to be as forward as they in adjusting every Thing in such a Manner as that the People may be relieved, and the Crown of *Great-Britain* maintained in that high Rank, which, as

a Maritime State especially, she is and ever will be entitled to hold (unless our Factions prevent it) among the Powers of *Europe*. This remains equally our Duty, whether the Crowns with whom we have made Peace, be sincere in their Intentions or not; if the former be the Basis of their Plan, we ought to avoid giving them any Temptation to alter it, by relapsing into those dangerous Feuds and Jealousies, which by shewing us to be a divided People, may encourage them to become our Enemies again; if the latter, it is still the more our Duty, because nothing but a steady Pursuit of these salutary Maxims can remove the Danger, by convincing them that the Hazard in such a Case will be much greater on their Side, than it can be on ours.

On the other hand, if we turn our Eyes towards the Conduct of our Confederates, we shall see as strong Reasons arise from thence. The Court of *Vienna* has already made such great and happy Alterations in the Management of her Affairs, as will enable the House of *Austria* to appear with that Lustre and Dignity, in which it is the Interest, as well as the Wish of her Allies, that she should ever continue. A strict Oeconomy in her Finances, a settled and well regulated Force in every Part of her Dominions, and a Disposition to share equally, amongst all her Subjects, the Blessings of a wise and mild Government in time of Peace, and to cultivate a sincere Friendship with their ancient and invariable Friends, appear to be the Maxims of that Cabinet. His *Sardinian* Majesty is no less intent upon the providing for the Security of his Dominions, the Welfare of his Subjects, and the maintaining the Peace and Independency of *Italy*, A fairer Prospect we never had of seeing the Republick of the United Provinces in a Condition to maintain their Freedom, and to act upon Principles suitable thereto, under the Auspice of that wise and excellent Prince,

whom the Voice of the People, obeying the Dictates of Divine Providence, hath let at the Head of their Government, and thereby restored as well the Strength as the Form of their ancient Constitution, by which they first acquired, and by which alone they can maintain their Liberty. We may from hence conclude, that the general Appearance of Things in favour of the Common Cause, will daily improve, and that as the Wealth, the Force, and the Independency of our old and natural Allies increase, they will draw to them not the Respect only, but the Confidence of their Neighbours, whose Interest it so visibly is, to depend rather on their Friendship and Protection from whom they have nothing to fear, than on the fair and flattering Promise, of Courts, from whom they have very little to hope; that we cannot entertain any reasonable Doubt of seeing their Credit and Influence extend as far in the Middle, as it visibly did in the Beginning of the present Century. Such a Prospect therefore ought to excite in us the most vigorous and hearty Emulation, that encouraged by mutual Examples, as well as conducted by the same honest and generous Principles, we may put an End to the Fears of *Europe*, by establishing such a Barrier as may dispirit the most ambitious Powers, and teach them to renounce those Projects that must tend to exhaust their Strength, and leave them, sooner or later, at the Mercy of their injured Neighbours.

In these Representations, what has been said proceeds upon plain and self-evident; Grounds, not from any Pretences to private Lights or secret Intelligences. All the Facts that we have mentioned are not only true, but notoriously so, and such as insinuate the contrary, if any such there be, cannot expect that we should prefer their Suspicions and Surmises to that daily Evidence we have from Events of a contrary State

of Things. Besides, granting even their Surmises and Suspicions to be true, the Inferences drawn, from them must become fresh Motives to determine us in a firm and constant Adherence to the Principles so often suggested and repeated. For what is there that can promote our Hopes, if well grounded, or secure us against our Apprehensions, if they are not without Grounds, than Unanimity and publick Spirit? Shall we preserve our Friends, shall we affright our Enemies, by falling out and renewing our Divisions amongst ourselves? Or after having experienced, in the Course of the War, so many and so great Mischiefs from this Cause, shall we still tempt Providence so far as to persist in trying what Inconveniencies may follow it in a Time of Peace? No certainly, there is in this something so mean and so ridiculous, as well as so preposterously wild and wicked, that it cannot enter into the Conceptions of Men, upon whom God has bestowed the Blessing of common Sense.

While we were involved in the War, the Supplies it required demanded all our Care, and the great Events thereof, with their Consequences, took up all our Attention, In such a Situation, Oeconomy and Frugality, tho' never more necessary, yet were with Difficulty to be practised; whatever good Wishes Men might have for the Service of their Country, it was impossible they should employ their Endeavours with much Effect, except in facilitating the raising of Money, or the promoting military or naval Operations. But now that is at an End, and we are restored to the Enjoyment of Calmness and Quiet, we have Leisure and Opportunity to consider of the most effectual Measures for reducing all Expences of Government within the narrowest Bound possible, raising Money upon the Subject in the easiest, speediest, and cheapest way that can be, applying it so as that it may

tend most to the common Advantage, and thereby not only prevent our adding in the least to the heavy Burthen of Debt already incurred, but providing for the gradual Discharge of it, which at the same time that it would relieve and rejoice, would redound likewise to the Honour and Credit of the Nation. We may find the proper Means to employ that noble Resolution, that indefatigable Patience, that vigorous and active Spirit, which our Soldiers and Sailors have discovered in Time of War for their own and for their Countrymen's Benefit in Time of Peace, by putting them in a Way of so employing their Industry, as that it may afford them a comfortable Subsistence. We may revive the old, and we may discover new Schemes of preserving, protecting, and promoting Navigation, by encouraging Trade, improving Manufactures, and having a constant Eye to our naval Force, which is at once the Grace and Glory of *Great Britain*.

All these Things demand indeed much Industry and Diligence, and cannot otherwise be accomplished than by forming wise Plans, and sticking to them closely when formed. But this may be very well done, if those entrusted with the Management of Affairs, and those for whom they manage, have but a good Understanding; if Statesmen will place their Ambition where it ought to be placed, in the Welfare of the State they direct, and if the People will be but content to encourage Men to mean well, by putting a right Construction upon their Meaning, all that we wish, and all that we want, may be certainly attained; and what this is may be thus explained, that the Excellence of our Constitution may shew itself as fully in the executive Part of our Government, as in its Structure, and that the Happiness of our political System may not appear only in Books, but be visible to the whole World, in the general Felicity of all who live under it.

F I N I S.

